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Introduction
Catastrophic events such as natural disasters have
an enormous impact on regional economies. In fact,
a vast literature on the economic impact of hurri-
canes, tornadoes and other disasters exists (Ewing,
Kruse and Sutter 2007). A strand of this research
utilizes regional labor market and output measures
as indicators of regional well-being and recovery. In
particular, many time series econometric studies
examine the economic impacts by comparing pre-
and post-disaster periods, primarily using variations
of event study techniques and intervention analysis.
As such, previous researchers have generally
focused on obtaining post-event periods that were
as long as possible in order to increase the number
of post-disaster data points. One drawback of the
event study line of research is that it does not pro-
vide ‘real time’ assessments of the impact of major
disasters.Another issue deals with the choice of the
appropriate performance measure to capture the
economic condition of the region. In this paper, we
illustrate how the use of regional-level (i.e. US
state) coincident indexes may be used to infer the
extent and magnitude of a natural disaster on a local
economy.
A number of time series studies have examined the
impact of tornadoes and hurricanes using monthly
labor market data (Ewing and Kruse 2001 and
2002; Ewing, Kruse and Thompson 2003, 2004,
2005a, 2005b and 2009).While employment-related
data is timely and regionally defined, by definition
it is a measure of the labor market and not of the
overall economy, although the two are certainly
related (Ewing, Kruse and Thompson 2003 and
2004; Skidmore and Toya 2002). Thus, one short-
coming to using employment or unemployment
rate data to infer overall economic impact is that it
does not account for payroll or wages, thus treating
all jobs equally and inherently treating the con-
sumption functions of various institutions and
households as homogeneous. In this respect, the
labor market approach, while informative, does not
capture the typical multiplier effects that one might
find estimated in input-output regional economic
models.
On the other hand, gross domestic product (GDP)
does measure the performance of the overall econ-
omy but is released on a quarterly basis at the
national (US) level and only annually at state and
regional levels (as defined by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis and the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics). Quarterly and annual frequencies can
be problematic when estimating the economic
impact of disasters since differences in the immedi-
ate and longer-term effects have been found to
exist (Ewing, Kruse and Thompson 2009).
Furthermore, GDP metrics at the state and region-
al level often lag two to three years, further com-
pounding the measurement problem. The lack of
timely information could lead policymakers into
making poor or suboptimal resource allocation
decisions.
One approach to resolve these issues combines sev-
eral regional economic indicators into a composite
index that can be tracked through the business cycle.
The composite index offers the potential of better
and, possibly, more complete information on the
condition of the economy than individual economic
indicators and would be more current than GDP
estimates. Consequently, a properly constructed
composite index more closely captures elements of
the overall economic well-being of a region than
using a single labor market measure and, simultane-
ously, is timelier than using a single output measure
such as gross product.
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Recently, Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005)
developed a consistent set of US state-level coinci-
dent indexes that are now produced by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Thompson (2009)
provided an example of how such a state-level
index could be used to measure the effect of a dis-
aster and the subsequent regional economic
response. In particular, Thompson (2009) focused
on Louisiana’s economy and hurricane Katrina,
which made its first landfall in southern Florida as
a category one storm, moved into the Gulf of
Mexico where it intensified, and made its second
landfall 29 August 2005 near the Louisiana-
Mississippi border as a category four storm. This
paper updates and expands the work of Thompson
(2009) and examines what,if any,effect Katrina had
on other states along the gulf coast.
Hurricane Katrina and the economy
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (2006) reports that the economic
cost of hurricane Katrina was nearly 100 billion US
dollars making it the most costly US disaster in
terms of economic losses.These losses resulted from
a major disruption in economic activity and physical
damage to infrastructure and homes.While previous
studies provided information as to the economic
impact on New Orleans (Guimaraes et al.1993;West
and Lenze 1994), the shear size and magnitude of
Katrina on such a major city required policymakers
to make immediate decisions with respect to recov-
ery. For this type of situation, timely and relevant
information is required.
Certainly, a number of factors help to determine the
impact of a hurricane on a regional economy includ-
ing the severity of the storm and its atmospheric
characteristics, the built environment and the area’s
economic structure. Ewing, Kruse and Sutter (2007)
provide a thorough review of the economic research
on hurricanes and describe various approaches to
modeling disasters. They conclude that valuable in-
formation can be derived from a variety of models;
however, certain decisions must be made in a short
time frame and thus sources of timely information is
necessary for efficient resource allocation.
The short-term disruption from a hurricane may
result in out-migration from the affected region to
another area and the resulting loss in human capital
may hinder future growth and recovery (Landry et
al. 2007).Standard macroeconomic theory highlights
how the losses in physical and human capital place a
drag on long-term growth and potential output of
the region. However, there is an inflow of financial
assistance from insurance to federal, state and local
aid.Additionally, following a disaster, the rebuilding
of infrastructure, networks, and the installation and
implementation of new technology may lead to high-
er growth over time. Moreover, the economic
improvement may spread to connecting regions.
Ewing, Kruse and Thompson (2005b) document this
effect following the 1999 Oklahoma City tornado
outbreak. They attribute much of this economic
change to improvements to the supply chain.
The approach of this paper is to examine the behav-
ior of the Louisiana state coincident index to deter-
mine the change in economic activity immediately
following hurricane Katrina.The recovery process is
followed through time to capture a sense of the
longer-term or ongoing effects of the hurricane on
the state.Additionally, the corresponding coincident
indexes of the other Gulf Coast states are tracked to
see the impact of Katrina and to document the
extent to which the impacts, both immediate and
ongoing,may have played out in the economic activ-
ities of those states.
Index composition
Regional policymakers need accurate and timely
information on the current state of the economy for
planning purposes.According to Crone (2006), state
and regional markets may not follow national trends
and cycles. Moreover, natural disasters are regional-
ly-specific events placing even greater importance
on accurate models of the regional economy for
planning purposes. While hurricane Katrina was a
major storm, its impact is still relatively regional to
the gulf coast states of the United States. As previ-
ously mentioned, such comprehensive measures of
the economy are often inadequate for timely region-
al information as to the impact of the storm. Due to
these shortcomings, a composite index of several
regional economic indicators may provide a better
and timelier measure of the regional business cycle
and its response to a disaster.
The approach that Crone and Clayton-Matthews
take is based on the Stock and Watson (1989)
dynamic single-factor model. The dynamic single-
factor model is a variation of principal component orCESifo Forum 2/2010 82
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factor analysis, where the resulting index represents
the underlying state of the economy.The structure of




where xt is the logarithm of the observed variable in
period t,st is the logarithm of the state variable to be
estimated (i.e.the common factor),and L represents
the lag operator.
The idiosyncratic components in the measurement
equations from (1) follow an autoregressive process
and are uncorrelated with one another. In particular
to developing a consistent set of state-level indexes,
Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005) use employ-
ment, unemployment, hours worked in manufactur-
ing, and real wages as the measurement variables in
equation (1).The underlying state of the economy is
represented by the state variable st and the final
index sets the estimated state variable to 100 (for a
given date). Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005)
retrend each index to the respective state GDP trend
to allow for comparisons across states.
Each month, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia produces the 50 state coincident index-
es.It is also worth noting that the indexes are re-esti-
mated each month with the revised data. Below, we
use the state coincident index to examine how
Louisiana’s economy responded before and after
hurricane Katrina. In addition,
we examine how other gulf coast
states responded.
Louisiana’s state coincident
index and hurricane Katrina
Figure 1 illustrates the growth in
economic activity for Louisiana
and the United States using the
index produced by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
From the figure, it is clear that
the state and national economy
do not always move together
further emphasizing the need to
have regional-specific measures
of the economy. The figure also
highlights the severity of hurricane Katrina relative
to past recessions.
Table 1 provides a comparison between Louisiana’s
economic activity and that of the United States dur-
ing the past five national recessions as noted by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).In
addition, note that Louisiana’s economy did not
experience a decline in economic activity as the
national economy entered two recessions (i.e. the
1980 and the 1990–91 recessions).With respect to the
1981 recession, Louisiana’s economy lagged the
national economy by seven months going into the
recession and about six months coming out of the
recession. While both the Louisiana and national
economy entered the 2001 recession at the same
time, the Louisiana economy lagged the US econo-
my by six months in coming out of the recession.The
NBER indicated that the latest recession started in
December 2007; however, Louisiana peaked in
January 2009 and has declined in economic activity
every month thereafter (to the end of the sample
period).Crone (2006) points outs that most states do
not always follow the national business cycle –
Louisiana does not simply mirror the behavior of the
national economy.
Since states may not necessarily follow the national
economy,their response to natural disasters may dif-
fer as well.Table 1 illustrates the timing of hurricane
Katrina. The Louisiana economy declined for three
months following the hurricane. Using the index, we
can measure how long it took for the state economy
to recover to its pre-hurricane level.Following hurri-
cane Katrina, the Louisiana index dropped to
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120.91 in September from 126.36 in August 2005.The
index continued to decline until its trough in
November 2005. The magnitude of the decline
equates to a 6.7 percent drop in overall economic
activity or the equivalent of an index reading from
June 1997 (November 2005 index = 117.84). Alter-
natively, Katrina destroyed approximately eight
years of economic progress in Louisiana. Over the
next 14 months, the index reverts back to its pre-
Katrina level of 126.62. From trough to pre-hurri-
cane level, it took 14 months to recover.
Hurricane Katrina and the other gulf coast state
coincident indexes
Figure 2 shows the state-level coincident indexes for
each of the gulf coast states: Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. Using the state
coincident indexes to examine how the other gulf
coast states responded to hurricane Katrina, it is
seen that only Mississippi shows signs of having been
impacted by the hurricane in terms of state econom-
ic activity. According to the state coincident index,
Mississippi’s economic activity
dropped 1.11 percent following
the hurricane. However, by the
end of 2005, Mississippi was
back to pre-hurricane index lev-
els. None of the other gulf coast
states experienced significant
drops in economic activity fol-
lowing the hurricane.
With the exception of Mississippi,
there does not appear to be a sig-
nificant drop in economic activity
for the other gulf coast states.
However, Katrina may have al-
tered the structure of the supply
chain and/or economic landscape
in other ways. If so, then the state
coincident indexes may exhibit different behaviors fol-
lowing the hurricane,indicative of underlying structur-
al changes in the economy.The monthly index values
may be used to track how gulf coast states co-move
before and after hurricane Katrina. One way to mea-
sure the co-movement between states is to compute
the proportion of time that the two states spend in the
same business cycle phase.The simple non-parametric
statistic known as ‘concordance’ may be used for this
exercise and is calculated as follows:
(4)
where T is the sample size and Si,t (Sj,t) is a binary
indicator series where the value is one when the
respective  i (j) state index is expanding and zero
when contracting.
Table 2 reports the degree of concordance between
Louisiana and the other gulf coast states before and
after hurricane Katrina. Prior to Katrina, there was a
relatively high degree of co-movement among
Table 1  
Peak to trough dates for Louisiana state coincident index 
State coincident index Official US recession Hurricane 
Peak to trough  –  1/1980 – 7/1980 
Peak to trough  2/1982 – 5/1983  7/1981 – 11/1982 
Peak to trough  –  7/1990 – 3/1991 
Peak to trough  3/2001 – 5/2002  3/2001 – 11/2001 
Peak to trough  1/2009 –  12/2007 – 
Katrina to trough  8/2005 – 11/2005  8/2005 
Trough to pre-Katrina 11/2005 – 1/2007 
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Louisiana and the other gulf coast states.Even though
Florida is not a border state with Louisiana,they tend-
ed to move together most of the time (i.e. 95 percent
of the time). However, the degree of co-movement
among the gulf coast states (with Louisiana) has
declined considerably following the hurricane. Most
notably, Florida and Louisiana are in the same busi-
ness cycle phase just 38 percent of the time.
The change in co-movements between Louisiana
and the other gulf coast states is consistent with a
major shift in economic relationships. In fact, the
decline in co-movements ranges from 12 to 60 per-
cent. In particular, this finding is in line with the ear-
lier work on disasters altering supply chains.Thus, at
least in the relatively short term, the destruction of
the economic landscape resulting from hurricane
Katrina appears to have isolated the state of
Louisiana from the other gulf coast states.It remains
to be seen if a re-building of the region will increase
the linkages to pre-storm levels.
Concluding remarks
This paper examined the use of state level composite
indexes for providing timely information as to the
economic response of a region to natural disasters.It
is shown how the state index can capture the eco-
nomic condition of a region and subsequently be
used to measure the extent and magnitude of a cata-
strophic event on economic activity.In particular,the
economic activity of Louisiana and the gulf coast
states were seen to have changed following hurri-
cane Katrina. Moreover, the results are consistent
with the devastation of Katrina altering the underly-
ing structure and/or supply chain of the region.
Policymakers can make more informed decisions
with objective or quantifiable data to facilitate a
more efficient recovery process. One such example
may be the media and news story about the increas-
es in tax revenues during the recovery process in
Louisiana (Eaton 2006).A state revenue forecaster
and subsequent policymakers may be interested in
knowing if this increase in tax revenues is a one-
time windfall or a longer-term gain due to the
implications on fiscal budgeting and planning. Use
of regional/state coincident indexes may shed light
on this question in a more timely fashion given the
use of monthly vs. yearly data. In the case of
Louisiana, the index rebounded to its pre-Katrina
level and thus the observed surge in tax revenues
were probably due to the purchase of replacement
goods as opposed to a permanent increase in con-
sumer spending.
Economic models for assessing the impact and
response of a region to a catastrophic event should
be both timely and able to capture the broad eco-
nomic condition of the affected area.However,these
two simple goals are not always met as broad mea-
sures of economic activity (e.g. GDP) are available
only at annual frequencies whereas more timely (i.e.
monthly) measures of economic performance are
often narrowly defined (e.g. unemployment).
This research demonstrated the use of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state coincident
indexes for modeling economic activity in the gulf
coast states for the case of hurricane Katrina. The
approach provides a broader and timelier estimate
as to the overall economic disruption and subse-
quent response to a major hurricane than the use of
state GDP or single-variable labor market indica-
tors. The findings are encouraging and suggest that
regional composite indexes may be used to comple-
ment standard measures of economic impact and
recovery.
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